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PLEA AGREEMENTS: PROGRESSING THE
FIGHT AGAINST CRIME OR BRIBING
WITNESSES?

I. INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining, the method of being lenient with a witness in order to convict his accomplice, is a significant weapon in a prosecutor's
arsenal and standard practice in the modem American criminal justice
system.' Opponents of plea-bargaining argue it is unfair to allow the
prosecution to trade leniency for testimony when courts forbid opposing
attorneys from granting anything to a witness in exchange for testimony
with the exception of basic expenses. 2 According to opponents, this disparity gives prosecutors an unfair advantage that can only be corrected
by suppressing testimony gained through plea agreements.3
The controversy over the validity of plea agreements increased in
1998 when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in United States v.
Singleton4 that plea agreements constituted bribes under 18 U.S.C. §
201(c)(2) (the Bribery Statute). 5 This resulted in the suppression of testimony that resulted from the plea agreement. 6 Shortly thereafter, attor'See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (characterizing plea agreements as most "ingrained" practice in American criminal justice
system).
2
See United States v. Fraguela, 1998 WL 560352, *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1998)
(outlining tools available to defense teams in comparison to those available to prosecution).
. See id. (describing prosecutorial tools).
4

144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998)

' See id. (holding plea-bargains violate Bribery Statute). The court applied the
plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
[W]hoever directly or indirectly gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any person, for of because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial...
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both.
Id.
, See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1361 (allowing defense motion to suppress accomplice
testimony).
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neys across the United States rushed to file motions to vacate convictions
based on testimony attained as the result of plea agreements. 7 The majority of decisions following Singleton rejected the bribery theory and
refused to hold the government bound under 18 U.S.C. §201(c)(2).8 At
the same time, the United States Senate came to the defense of prosecutors and drafted a bill specifically providing that plea agreements are not
a violation of the Bribery Statute.9 This scrutiny of plea-bargaining
shows the vulnerability of a practice believed to have an unshakable
foundation.'0
This note begins by providing a chronology of the use of plea
bargains and the manner in which they gained acceptance as a regular
practice in the American criminal justice system." This note then discusses the plain meaning rule and the debate over its use.' 2 Furthermore,
this note will investigate the application of the plain meaning rule to the
Bribery Statute and the effect that Singleton and subsequent decisions
had on this debate.' 3 Finally, this note will discuss how plea bargaining
has become an indispensable tool in fighting crime,4 specifically in combating and controlling crimes involving complicity.

'See e.g. Patricia Nealon, Massachusetts Lawyers Await Effects of ColoradoRuling, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1998, at BI (documenting at least three motions to suppress in Massachusetts based on Singleton decision).
8 See e.g. United States v. Barbaro, 1998 WL 556152, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1998)
(explaining long history of plea bargaining in United States); United States v. Reid, 19 F.
Supp.2d 534, 535 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating courts have continually supported exchange
of leniency for testimony); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521 (D. Md.
1998) (refusing to follow Singleton). The Eisenhardt court opined that the chances of
the Supreme Court agreeing with the Singleton decision was "about the same as discovering that the entire roster of the Baltimore Orioles consists of cleverly disguised leprechauns." Id.
'See S. 2311, 10 5t n Cong. (1998). The bill also states that the exclusion of prosecutors from the Bribery Statute would be retroactive. Id.
'"See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)
(stating that plea agreements are "ingrained" practice in America).
"See infra notes 15-45 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying
text.
"3See infra notes 59-127 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 128-141 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORY

A. Plea Agreements
The practice of plea-bargaining dates back to old English law. 5
As early as 1892, the United States Supreme Court recognized the admissibility of a co-defendant's testimony for the prosecution.16 The
Court reasoned that just as the defendant has a right to testify, so should
his accomplice. 17 For some time, plea agreements remained a hidden
component of trial practice.' 8 Plea agreements gained recognition and
validation when the Supreme Court found that plea-bargaining is a key
element in fighting crime and encouraged the practice.19 It was widely
acknowledged that the witness who has the most detailed knowledge of a
crime is often a co-conspirator. 20 Courts, however, noted some potential
problems regarding plea agreements.2 ' One court supported the procedure of plea bargaining while at the same time calling it an "inducement
to lie." 22
In recent years, courts have made an effort to better define the
elements of a valid plea agreement.2 3 Judges tempered the strength of
's See Rex v. Rudd, 99 Eng. Rep. 1114 (1775) (allowing exchange of leniency for
witness' testimony).
'6 See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 337 (1892) (holding that accomplice
not prevented from testifying solely because they are interested party).
" See id. at 64 (equating rights of conspirators). See also Rosen v. United States,
245 U.S. 467, 472 (1917) (discussing how Benson case sparked acceptance of accomplice testimony on state level).
" See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (asserting that plea bargains
"shrouded in secrecy and deliberately concealed").

" See United States v. Santabello, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (stating that pleabargaining were "essential component of the administration of justice"). See also United
States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Va, July 28, 1998) (noting long history of
accepting plea agreements).
20See United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192,196 (1st Cir. 1985) (explaining need
for plea agreements).
21 See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheo, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (re-

quiring attorneys disclose plea agreements in court).
2" See id. In Cervantes, the court held that plea agreements are acceptable so long
as the agreement is disclosed at trail and the jury has an opportunity to evaluate the witness' credibility. Id.
23See

infra notes 58-68 (discussing elements of valid plea agreements).
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plea-bargains by requiring prosecutors to disc!ose the terms and details
of the bargain at trial. 24 Opponents of plea-bargaining counter that when
a witness is promised leniency that witness is induced to offer testimony
that will aid the prosecution, thereby increasing the possibility that the
witness will feel compelled to commit perjury.25 In an effort to mitigate
the possibility of perjury in plea-bargained testimony, one court ruled
that plea agreements that are contingent upon the issuing of an indictment or the success of a prosecution is unconstitutional.26 Similarly,
courts forbid prosecutors from withholding the benefits of a plea bargain
until after they achieve the desired result. 27 When the government waits
to fulfill the terms of a plea bargain, the threat of prosecution continues
to plague the witness, therefore making him or her feel a sense of obligation to please the government and results in a violation of the defendant's due process. 28 If a prosecutor uses this carrot and stick approach,
he violates his duty to search 29out the truth rather than merely follow a
pre-determined theory of guilt.

24

See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (ordering new trial be-

cause plea agreement not disclosed). In Giglio, the court ordered a new trial because the
prosecutor had no knowledge of, and therefore did not disclose during the trial, the existence of a plea agreement between the government and witness. Id.
2 See United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d. 1527, 1531 (8th Cir. 1984) (describing
contingent plea agreements as "invitation to perjury"). The defense in Waterman argued
that the testimony gained as a result of a plea agreement is so likely to be tainted that it
cannot be trusted. Id. See also Franklin v. Nevada, 577 P.2d. 860, 861-62 (1978) (overruledby Sheriff, Humbolt County v. Acuna, 819 P.2d 197 (Nev. 1991) (approving use of
plea agreements so long as plea agreements not contingent on outcome of trial). The
Franklin court held that to make a plea agreement contingent would violate due process
by inducing the witness to testify in a certain manner. Id. See also United States v.
Fraguela, 1998 WL 560352,*1 (E.D. La. Aug. 27) (arguing that despite good faith of
prosecutors, plea agreements may tempt witnesses to lie).
26
See Waterman, 732 F.2d. at 1531 (holding that contingent plea agreements violate due process); Franklin,577 P.2d at 863 (discussing witness' perception of plea
agreement). The court in Franklinfound that if the terms of a plea agreement would
make a reasonable witness feel that he/she is required to lie in order to fulfill the conditions of the bargain, the agreement violates the defendant's right to due process. Id.
See Franklin, 577 P.2d at 866. (holding it violated due process for government
to withhold "fruits" of bargain for three years).
2' See id. at 221 (stating that witness' sense of obligation to prosecutor can violate
due process).
29 See id. at 225 (stating when prosecutors merely follow theory of guilt disrespects
idea of presumed innocence).
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Historically, the possible rewards involved in plea agreements
have not been limited to leniency.3 0 In addition to promises of reduced
sentences, courts have approved cash payments of over one million dollars to witnesses.3 One court approved a reward of a liquor license in
return for cooperation with a government investigation.32
The plea agreement process has a strong procedural and historical
foundation.3 3 Theorists reason that the prosecutors who reach plea
agreements with witnesses do not hold the power over that witness' final
sentence, but rather act only in an advisory capacity during the witness'
sentencing. 34 It is the sentencing judge and not the prosecutor who
makes the final determination on how to reward the cooperation of the
witness, leaving prosecutors only able to offer advice thereon. 35 Often
when drafting plea agreements, prosecutors limit their promise to merely
informing the court of the plea agreement and advising the court to reduce the witness' sentence. 6 Procedural guidelines determine that
prosecutors can agree to three actions in return for cooperation: (1) a
motion to dismiss other charges; (2) a recommendation for a specific
sentence; and (3) an agreement that a specific sentences is appropriate.37

30See United States v. Issacs, 347 F. Supp. 763, 767 (N.D. Ill., 1972) (exchanging
liquor license for cooperation).
31See Richard A. Serrano, Ruling Against Testimony Deals Hits Prosecutors,Los
ANGELES TIMES, July 10, 1998, at AI (criticizing Singleton court for jeopardizing other
prosecutions). Emad Ali Salem received a cash payment after agreeing to be a witness in
the trial of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Id. Rahman faced charges of plotting to blow
up the United Nations building in New York City. Id. See also Hoffa v. United States
385 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1966) (reasoning ability to cross-examine paid witnesses regarding agreement as safeguard against unfair advantage).
32 See Issacs, 347 F. Supp. at 767 (N.D. Ill., 1972) (equating value of liquor license
with value of leniency offered in other plea agreements).
3' See United States v. Santabello, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (stating that pleabargaining is "essential component of the administration ofjustice"). See also United
States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Va, July 28, 1998) (noting long history of
accepting plea agreements).
3
1See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Section
175.1 (2d Ed. 1987) (finding that prosecutor simply gives court his/her opinion as to
appropriate sentence).
35See id. (stating that prosecutor's role in determining sentence in advisory).
See, e.g. United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 722 (E.D. Mich., 1998)
(noting sentencing judge makes final decision as to level of leniency witness is afforded); U.S.S.G. Section 5KI.1(a)(2) (allowing judge to take witness' helpfulness into
consideration when reaching sentence).
3
1 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e) (West 1999).
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Despite the pervasiveness of plea agreements, prosecutors do not
have free reign when it comes to bargaining. 3s There are sufficient safeguards in place to prevent an unfair prosecutorial advantage such as: (1)
full disclosure of the agreement to the jury; (2) allowing defense counsel
to cross-examine the witness with regard to the plea agreement; and (3)
giving the jury specific instructions to weigh the witness' testimony with
caution. 39 In an effort to further safeguard agreements against misinterpretation, prosecutors are advised to make each agreement as explicit and
specific as possible.4n
The reasoning behind the need for plea agreements is simple: the
high number of cases resolved through plea agreements takes the burden
and the expense of trials off the judicial system. 4' In addition to the financial benefits of plea bargaining, the process reduces the possibility
that there may be an error made in guilt determination and provides a
certainty not available with an unpredictable trial.42 If a state had an
aversion to the practice of plea-bargaining, however, that state could
decide to ban the practice on the state level.43 The Supreme Court has
ruled that while plea bargains are not constitutionally forbidden, they are
also not protected from abolition. 44 No state has imposed such a ban. In

sa See id. (vesting power in sentencing judge).
39 See United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 196 (1st Cir.
1985) (revising lower
court decision regarding risk or perjury). Although the district court in Dailey felt the
danger of perjury made plea agreements unconstitutional, the appeals court felt that
while there was a possibility of perjury it was not enough to violate due process. Id. The
appeals court pointed out that even uncorroborated testimony from a witness who had
committed perjury before was admissible as long as it was not "incredible on its face."
Id. at 198 (quoting Lyda v. United States 321 F.2d 788, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1963)). See
also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227 (1941) (stating that taking accomplice's
cooperation into consideration not violation of due process).
See Dailey, 759 F.2d at 201 (explaining importance of plea agreements); see
also United States v. Santabello, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (stating prosecutors must
explain their intentions to sentencing judge).
" See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (encouraging plea agreements as means of reducing backlogs in courts).
42 See Note, Plea Bargainingand the Transformationof
the CriminalProcess, 90
HARV. L. REV. 564, 573-76 (1977) (explaining that plea agreements remove questions of
guilt).
g See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978) (placing decision on
whether or not to continue practice on states).
4 See id. (stating that states can restrict use of plea agreements).
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fact, plea bargains continue to increase in usage, accounting for an overwhelming percentage of guilty pleas in criminal cases.4 5

B. 18 U.S. C. §201(c)(2) and the Plain Meaning Rule

Whoever directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises
anything of value to any person, for or because of the
testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given
by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding, before any court, any committee of
wither House or both Houses of Congress, or any
agency, commission, or officer authorized by the laws of
the united States to hear evidence or take testimony, or
for or because of such person's absence therefrom; shall
be fined under this title or imprisonedfor not more than
two years, or both.46
The debate over the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Section 201 provision
begins with the struggle to define the term "whoever., 47 Traditionally,
when Congress uses ambiguous language, the plain meaning of that word
can be used. 48 As a result, one can imply the term "whoever" includes
all people in the United States, including the government and government officials.49 In the absence of express exclusion, there is a limited
exception that allows the exclusion of the government from the plain
meaning rule. 50 Courts may hold that a statute does not apply to the government and its agents if: (1) the application of the law would prevent
the government from executing an established right or; (2) the application of the law would "work an obvious absurdity." 51 By allowing only
* See Yvette A. Beema, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under ContingentPlea
Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 801 (1987) (explaining ninety percent of criminal
defendants plead guilty, in large part from plea agreements).
18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2).

'7See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (explaining plain
meaning rule's application when language has commonly accepted definition).
48See id. (detailing application of plain meaning rule).
4

9 See

id. (applying term "anyone" to government officials in federal wiretapping

case).
"See id. at 383-84 (outlining possible exclusions of government and government
officials).
51Id. The court exemplified requiring a police officer involved in a chase to follow the speed limit as an example of an "obvious absurdity." Id.

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. V

limited scope in interpreting statutory language, courts avoid the perception that the judicial branch of the government is acting as a legislator.5 2
Courts have also grappled with the definition of a "thing of
value." There is no requirement that the item exchanged for testimony
have a discernable cash value. 3 Therefore, a "thing of value" can be
intangible, such as special prison visitation rights. 54
Prosecutors argue, and some courts agree, that to hold government officials bound to Section 201(c)(2) restrains the government's
ability enforce the law. 5 To include the government under the statute
would hinder prosecutors' ability to convict those involved in the types
of crimes that thrive on complicity, such as organized crime and drug
trafficking.5 6 In these areas, the government often depends on plea
agreements to build their cases. 7

III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND REASONING

A. Singleton Decision and the Application of the Plain Meaning Rule to
the Bribery Statute
The defendant and witness involved in Singleton were part of a
drug trafficking ring; the kind of accomplice-rich crime group that is
often brought to justice through plea-bargaining.58 In order to convict
the defendant, prosecutors used plea-bargaining to obtain an accom-

"2See

United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1357 (S.D. Fla., 1998) (em-

ploying plain meaning rule to 18 U.S.C. §201 (c)(2)); United States v. Fraguela, 1998
WL 560352, *1 (E.D. La Aug. 27, 1998) (stating that when language of statute unambiguous plain mean applies).
See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 55 (1997) (including "contact visits"
to prisoner as item of value).
54

id.

See United States v. White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (classifying prosecutors as law enforcement agents).
See id. (explaining importance of plea agreement in prosecuting complicity
crimes).
17 See id. (illustrating prosecution dependence on
plea agreements).
68See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting defendant was part of operation that transferred drug money via Western Union).
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plice's testimony. 59 On appeal, the defense argued that prosecutors violated Section 201(c)(2) by bribing the witness with the promise of a reduced sentence.r °
The Singleton Court broke Section 201(c)(2) into three components: (1) an offer or promise, either direct or indirect; (2) of value; (3)
given for or because of sworn testimony. 61 The court ruled that the
agreement does not need to affect the witness' testimony in any way.62
Applying the plain meaning rule, the court held prosecutors bound under
Section 201(c)(2)
and suppressed testimony gained through a plea
63
agreement.

The court rejected the government's arguments that disallowing
the plea bargain conflicts with the immunity statute. 64 The court reasoned that the prosecution merely asks the court to grant immunity with
the court ultimately deciding whether to grant immunity. 65 The court
further ruled that immunity does not provide a benefit to the witness but
rather it only lifts the witness' Fifth Amendment privilege.66 Therefore,
the immunity statute operates independently of Section 201(c)(2). 67 One
judge in the Singleton decision advised the government that they would
59See id. (describing sentences of witness and defendant). As a result of the testimony of a witness who had been persuaded to testify by a plea agreement, the defendant
received a jail sentence while the individual who ran the crime ring was not confronted
with any witnesses who entered plea bargains and was not sentenced to any jail time. Id.
See id. The prosecution did not actually promise the witness a sentence reduction. Id. Rather, they promised to refrain from prosecuting the witness on related offenses and to advise the sentencing court and a parole board of the witness' cooperation.
Id.
61 See id. at 1358 (interpreting Section 201 (c)(2) using plain meaning rule).
62 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1359 (explaining statutory requirements).
See id. at 1344-45 (describing difference between sovereign and government officials). The court held that while the government as an entity may be excluded from the
statute, government agents and officials are required to carry out their duties in a manner
consistent with Section 201(c)(2). Id. The court stated its power to suppress evidence
gives the court a vehicle to "deter official misconduct" and destroy tainted testimony. Id.
at 1360.
See id. at 1348 (stating that judge retains ability to grant immunity).
See id. at 1358 (reasoning that immunity serves to lift Fifth Amendment privilege). The court further ruled that immunity is not a gift in the same way that a reduced
sentence is because all immunity, in effect, only lifts the Fifth Amendment privilege
during testimony. Id.
"See id. (explaining that under immunity witness can testify without incriminating him/herself).
67 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at1355 (providing immunity to lift Fifth Amendment
privilege).
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be better served by requesting immunity for witnesses rather than entering a plea agreement that would induce the witness to "embellish" his
testimony .68
The Singleton court also rejected the government's argument that
limiting plea agreements inhibits a prosecutor's ability to enforce the
law. The court reasoned that its decision merely banned plea bargains
made in exchange for testimony. 69 The court ruled that witnesses are still
free to assist the government's investigations and prosecution without
actually testifying. 70 Prosecutors can still make agreements with accomplices for other forms of assistance, such as helping locate a suspect or a
witness.7 1
The government also argued that the plea agreement involved did
not amount to a "thing of value" under Section 201(c)(2).72 The court,
however, ruled that it is established that a "thing of value" does not need
to be an item with a cash or commercial value.7 3 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that personal freedom is an item to which people attach a great
deal of value.74 The court went so far as to compare the plea bargain to
an offer of money in return for perjured testimony. 75 The court reminded76
the prosecution that all citizens have a duty to testify truthfully.
Through the submission of the accomplice's testimony, the court believed it leveled the playing field and removed what had been an unfair
advantage to the prosecution.7 7

" See David. E. Rovella, Pleas: Justice of Bribery? l0th CircuitHearsArguments
on Whether to Outlaw FederalPlea Bargainsthat Require Testimony, NAT'L L.J. AI
(Nov. 30, 1998) (describing exchange between judge and prosecutor during hearing).
69See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1355 (outlining possible alternative means to use witnesses who reach plea bargains).
70See id. (explaining "myriad" of ways witnesses can aid prosecution without
taking witness stand).
71See id. (describing areas where witnesses can aid prosecutors).
7

See id. at 1248-49 (arguing that plea agreements have no monetary value).

73See

id. at 1349 (citing to history assigning value to material objects as well as

money).
74See
75See

Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1357 (valuing liberty above monetary gain).
id. at 1358 (explaining that excluding prosecutors from statute would allow
exchange of money for favorable testimony).
76 See id. (referring to oath taken by witnesses).
" See id. at 1347 (proclaiming that "decency, security and liberty" called for court
to treat government and citizens alike).
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The court used another provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 201(c)(1), to
support their reasoning.78 Section 201(c)(1) begins with the following
exemption: "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge
of official duty. 7 9 If Congress intended to exclude government officials
from Section 201(c)(2), the court explained, the same term would have
been included within the statute8.
The government argued that it is excluded from Section 201(c)(2)
under the law enforcement justification. 8' The Singleton court rejected
this argument by ruling that there is no law enforcement justification for
prosecutors because they are not acting in the capacity of peace
officers. 82 The court reasoned that prosecutors do not fall under the exclusion because they do not actively participate in enforcement actions,
such as arrest or chase. 83 The court rejected the government's argument
that because they could not find a case that included prosecutors after the
commencement of criminal proceedings. 84 Once the government's actions moved from investigation to trial, the court reasoned, the prosecutors lost any chance of exclusion under the law enforcement
justification. 85
In summary, the court illustrated a number of means to reward
cooperation and that Congress allowed for such rewards leaving the
quantity of relief to the discretion of judges.8 6 The Singleton court cited
United States Sentencing Guidelines, which allows a judge to grant a
downward departure in return for substantial assistance." The court established that by giving these rewards after the witness cooperates (as
78See

id. at 1350 (detailing statutory provisions).

See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1350 (quoting 18 U.S.C. Section 201 (c)(1)).
9,See id. (showing proximity as evidence that express exclusion in first implies inclusion in second).
81See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (explaining exclusion79

ary rule for government and its officials).
' See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1353 (applying law enforcement justification to "enforcement actions").
" See id. (reasoning that prosecutors are not active law enforcers).
See id. (citing United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1990) (excluding
prosecutors once proceedings begin).
86 See id. at 1354 (stating that law enforcement exception does not extend to court
proceedings).
N See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(e) which allows court to impose sentence
below minimum).
' See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1355 (citing U.S.S.G. Section 5K1.I) (allowing
downward departure for cooperation).
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opposed to signing plea agreements in advance of testimony) there is no
88
inducement towards perjury. Through this manner, the court preserved
the process of rewarding witnesses without violating Section 201(c)(2).

B. The Debate on PleaAgreements and the Bribery Statute
Commentators immediately termed the Singleton decision both
"stunning" and "revolutionary." 89 The decision gave defendants convicted on the testimony of their accomplices hope that their convictions
may be overturned or they may be granted a new trial. 9° Courts across
the country weighed in with their opinions of the Singleton decision and
almost exclusively rejected the bribery theory for the ban of pleabargains. 9' Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the Singleton decision, thus continuing the debate about plea-bargains
and the Bribery Statute.9 2

See id. (explaining that when witness testifies prior to leniency his/her testimony
is not tainted).
" See Marcia Coyle, Stunning Rulings Curtail Prosecutor'sPower. Testimony
Can't Be Bought; Immunity's Scope Widened, NAT'L L. J. (July 20, 1998) at Al (outlining Singleton decision); see also Harvey Silvergate, Immunity Is Not For Sale, Says
the Tenth Circuit,NAT'LL.J. (Aug. 17, 1998) at A19 (finding that court's decision to
equate plea bargains with bought testimony shocked federal prosecutors).
" See Nealon supra note 7 at B I (describing motions for new trial filed in Massachusetts).
9"See United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1352 (S.D. Fla., 1998) (suppressing testimony based on "clear and unambiguous meaning of Section 201 (c)(2));
United States v. Fraguela, 1998 WL 560352,*1 (E.D. La., Aug. 27, 1998) (adopting both
Singleton and Lowery decisions). See United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 722
(E.D. Mich., 1998) (upholding governments ability to reach plea agreements); United
States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp.2d 534, 538 (E.D. Va., 1998); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10
F. Supp. 2d 521 (D.Md., 1998). Butt see United States v. Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d 705,
712 (S.D. Fla., 1998) (acknowledging plea bargains as necessity); United States v. Pungitore, 15 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 (E.D. Pa., 1998); United States v. Gabrouel, 1998 WL
515947 (D.Colo., Aug. 17, 1998); United States v. McGuire, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270
(D. Kan., 1998); United States v. Barbaro, 1998 WL 556152 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 1, 1998);
United States v. Szur, 1998 WL 661484 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 1998); United States v.
White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (E.D.N.C., 1998); United States v. McClelland, 1998
WL 773171 (D. Kan., Nov. 15, 1998); United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d. 359, 363 (5th
Cir. 1998).
'See Singleton 165 F.3d at 1297 (rejecting Singleton's three judge panel's decision).
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Some theorists argue that it is a mistake to dismiss the bribery
theory simply because the plea-bargaining process is ingrained in our
judicial system and changing the process would cause a flood of similar
motions to suppress.9 3 Courts exist to protect the citizens, it is reasoned,
and such a limited line of reasoning does not serve the interest of the
citizens. 94 If judges gave such heavy weight to preserving the status quo,
courts may not have reached landmark decisions such as those that led to
the end of segregation.95
Plea bargain supporters also argue that an abolition of pleabargains could pose a serious threat to law enforcement. 96 If prior convictions that relied on accomplice testimony were overruled, the release
of dangerous criminals, such as those convicted of the Oklahoma City
Federal Building bombing and the World Trade Center bombing, would
follow. 97 In this age of highly publicized trials and pervasive crime stories, the public wants to see those most responsible for crimes go to jail,
even if that means letting their accomplices receive leniency. 98 Cases
aimed at dissolving notorious organized crime rings hinged on the validity of plea-bargains signed by accomplices." Rejecting this practice
" See Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1355 (reasoning potential burden on judicial system warranted rejection of Singleton holding). The court in Lowery explained that the
threat of an overwhelming number of motions to dismiss is not a good enough reason to
reject the Singleton decision. But see White, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (attesting to longstanding approval of plea bargains). See also Gabrourel,1998 WL 515947 (refraining
from ruling against history of plea bargains); Barbaro 1998 WL 556152 (validating plea
bargains); Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d 705 (finding plea bargains necessary to law enforcement).
" See Coyle, supra note 89 (outlining Singleton decision); Silvergate, supra note
89 (explaining Singleton decision's effect on federal prosecutors).
See Rovella, supra note 68 at Al (outlining defense's argument in Singleton).
See White, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (holding that to reject plea agreements would
obstruct justice and prevent convictions); see also Haese, 162 F.3d. at 364 (describing
negative effect of Singleton decision). The court in Haese compared following the Singleton decision to putting "shackles" on or "crippling" the government's ability to fight
crime. Id. See also Appellate Court Reconsiders Plea-BargainTestimony Ban; Attorneys
Debate Favors,SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Nov. 18, 1998) at A7(quoting prosecutor
referring to ruling in Singleton as paralyzing).
97 See Serrano, supra note 31 (outlining threat to other cases). The convictions of
those people involved in both the New York World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City bombing involved the testimony of accomplices who made plea bargains with
prosecutors. Id. Lawyers for Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh were reported
to be carefully following the Singleton decision. Id.

See id. (describing merit of plea agreements).
See Nealon, supra note 7 (detailing reaction to Singleton decision). The murder
and drug trafficking trial of two members of the Intervale Posse gang, a well established
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threatens to eradicate any possibility of conviction and allows reputed
criminals to go unpunished.1' ° Prosecutors have alternative methods,
including the use of the government's agents, surveillance, and resources, to aid in the investigation and prosecution of criminals.'' Plea
bargains, however, help connect evidence gathered in the field investigation to courtroom testimony.10 2
Some theorists argue the existence of plea agreements are validated by the sentencing guidelines allowing judges to give downward
departure in return for cooperation. °3 The final decision of leniency
rests with the judge; the prosecutors have only the power of persuasion
when requesting a reduction in an accomplice's sentence. °4 In fact,
sentencing guidelines that allow for downward departures and the recognition of plea agreements existed before Section 201(c)(2), therefore
implying the inclusion of prosecutors in Section 201(c)(2).'05 This rationale could also apply to the Bribery Statute because Congress included
an exclusion for government officials in Section 201(c)(1), but refrained
from doing so in Section 201(c)(2).1°6
In addition to the differing opinions on congressional intent, other
questions remain about the interpretation of the Section 201 (c)(1). One
possible reading finds the exceptions for government officials set out in
an all-inclusive list, while another interpretation provides those exceptions as merely examples or ways that the government can be excluded
from statutory language.' 0 7 Therefore, it is unclear whether the language
criminal element in New England, included testimony from three gang members who
reached plea agreements with federal prosecutors. Id.
'0 See id. (explaining need for plea agreements to enforce crimes involving complicity).
'0'See United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (outlining tools that prosecutor's have).
o2 See id. (describing ban on defense exchanging anything for testimony).
'oSee United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 722 (E.D. Mich 1998) (outlining ability of judge to reduce sentence).
'" See United States v. White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D. N.C. 1998) (minimizing prosecutor's effect on sentencing).
'" See Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 718-19 (explaining lack of express exclusion of
government). The Arana court held that the lack of an express inclusion of the government in Section 201 (c)(2), coupled with the previously enacted sentencing guidelines,
implies the exclusion of government officials. Id.
'o"See Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1352 (adopting Singleton decision and disallowing use of plea agreement).
'07 See White, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 650 (explaining that Nardone provided only partial
list of exceptions to plain meaning rule); United States v. Szur, 1998 WL 661484, *1

20001

PLEA AGREEMENTS

of the statute requires
an explicit exclusion of the government barring
08
express inclusion.1
Courts can allow a prosecutor's request for leniency even after
applying Section 201(c)(1). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
allow the court to grant the motion for a reduction in sentence in response to cooperation with prosecutors. 1 9 To apply the plain meaning
rule to include the government in Section 201(c)(2) would work a kind of
"obvious absurdity" by preventing the government from taking an allowed action." Similarly, the application of the statute to prosecutors
would seem to contrast with their ability to request immunity for a witness."' This absurdity could extend to forcing the government to aban2 The number of cases
don entire cases due to the loss of plea bargains."
3
thousand."1
at risk could amount to several
One could also argue an absurdity exists if prosecutors are not included in the "officer of the law" exception. 1 4 There is an inconsistency
at work when prosecutors are separated from the government as a sovereign.' 15 The Singleton court excluded the government from Section
201(c)(2) because the government is a sovereign. 1 6 The court, however,
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 1998) (holding that any inclusion of government must be expressed); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d534, 540 (E.D. Va., 1998) (citing Nardone
v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937)) (allowing plea agreements); Arana, 18 F.
Supp. 2d at 720 (explaining that Singleton court read Nardone case "too narrowly").
" See United States v. Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707 (S.D.Fla., 1998) (outlining debate over need for explicit exclusion of government). But see Lowery, 15 F.
Supp. 2d at 1352-53 (holding that government agents should be treated same as citizens).
The court in Lowery illustrated the importance of holding the government responsible to
the same laws that apply to citizens, calling it the cornerstone of democracy. Id.
'09See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (West 1999).
0
" See Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 707-08 (finding reasoning in Singleton unconvincing); cf United States v. Fraguela, 1998 WL 560352, *1 (E.D. La., Aug. 27, 1998)
(holding application of plain meaning rule does not cause obvious absurdity).
. See United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 119 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (finding
no difference between request for immunity, request for downward departure, and plea
agreement).
112 See Reid, 19 F. Supp.2d at 537 (illustrating importance of testimony of accomplices in order to resolve cases).
13 See United States v. White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (holding
that prosecutors need plea bargains in order to do their job).
14 See Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (citing federal immunity statute as evidence
that prosecutors not meant to be covered by § 201(c)(2)).
" See White, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (rejecting Singleton decision).
1 See Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining government
sovereignty). The court in Singleton explained Section 201 (c)(2) did not apply to the
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refrained from extending that coverage to government employees." 17 The
result is absurd because prosecutors do not bring cases in their individual
capacity, but rather as an instrument of the United States government." 8
Therefore, by not including prosecutors under the exclusion allowed to
officers of the law, the Singleton court deprived the government of its
fundamental right to bring people who break the laws to justice." 9
In an effort to prevent the interpretation of Section 201(c)(2) from
weighing on courts, the United States Senate proposed a bill aimed at
finalizing congressional intent with regard to the Bribery Statute. 2 ° The
Senate responded to the debate with a retroactive correction to Section
201(c)(2).' 2 ' The impetus for the proposed bill may have originated from
a suggestion that Congress could single-handedly end the procedural2
arguments revolving around plea-bargains and the Bribery Statute.' 2
The Senate measure would reword Section 201(c)(2) to include an exception for prosecutors and specifically exclude "plea bargain agreements" from the statute. 23 The measure clarifies the congressional intent
in the original statute by stating:
There is no evidence in legislative history or otherwise
that Congress intended for Section 201 of Title 18,
United States Code, to make illegal the traditional prosecutorial practice of recommending leniency or other favorable action towards a defendant in exchange for truthful testimony or other cooperation with the prosecution
of another defendant. 24

government as an entity, but only to the means employed by government officials, including prosecutors, while carrying out government business. Id.
"1

See id.
See id. (describing prosecutor as extension of government).

"See

id. (reasoning that prosecutors are part of government).

2 See S. 2311, 10 5
measure. Id.
121 See id. at § 2(1).

h

Cong. (1998). Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) proposed the

'
See Joan Biskupic, Justice Dept. to Appeal Court Ban on 'Deals' with Witnesses, WASHINGTON POST (July 10, 1998) at A3 (describing outcry for legislative resolution to government exclusion from Bribery Statute). The Washington Post reported
that Justice Department officials went public with their belief that Congress could solve
the disputes arising from the Singleton decision by rewriting the Bribery Statute. Id.
t
'' See S.2311, 1 0 5 h Cong., § 3(a), (1998) (allowing plea agreements, immunity

deals, protection and other items of value).
'24 Id. at § 2 (1).
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This proposed language recognizes that the statute must allow prosecutors to use reasonable discretion in enforcing the law.125 The measure
also avoids the foreseeable onslaught of appeals and motions26to suppress
by making the amendments to Section 201(c)(2) retroactive.

IV. ANALYSIS
Prosecutors cannot simply advocate conviction, but rather have a
duty to employ fair procedure in an effort to find the truth. 27 It is well
accepted that a plea agreement affects the weight of testimony, not the
admissibility. 28 Courts found that stem cross-examination justifies the
admissibility of accomplice testimony. 29 The admissibility of these plea
arrangements shifts the responsibility over to the jury in order to determine how the witness' plea agreement may have colored his
testimony.' 30 In addition, it does not behoove the witness to perjure himas a failure to cooperate and therefore
self since perjury could be viewed
3
invalidate the plea agreement.' '
There are a number of ways in which plea agreements are safeguarded against an excess of power. 32 Plea-bargains, however, should
not be immune from scrutiny nor should they be viewed as an easy solution. 33 Witnesses have a duty to tell the truth under oath and if prose2

See id. at § 2(6) (rejecting ruling in Singleton and any concurring decisions).

12

' See id.
'2

See United States v. Santobello, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971) (explaining

prosecutors must work together and share information about plea agreements).
'2 See United States v. Kimble, 719 F. 1253, 1257 (5th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that
weight of testimony is question for jury). The Kimble court felt that allowing the cross
examination of the accomplice and the disclosure of the plea agreement were acceptable
if the court allowed the jury to decide what weight to give the testimony. Id.
'29 See id. at 1255 (suggesting defense attorney can use cross-examination to expose bias of accomplice witness).
3
1 1 See U.S. v. Jones, 575 F.2d 81, 85-6 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding no policy reason
exists to exclude informant testimony even if informant was paid). The Jones court felt
it was better to leave the determination of witness credibility to the jury. id.
... See United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 196 (1985) (suggesting all plea
agreements should stipulate that lying under oath violates agreement).
132 See Wright, supra note 34 (stating that judge retains final word and prosecutor's
role in determining sentence in advisory).

See Dailey, 759 F.2d at 201 (explaining importance that plea agreements be
tempered by disclosure in court).
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cutors are too quick to offer a plea agreement, witnesses may begin to
for testimony rather than viewing their
expect something in exchange
34
truthfulness as an obligation.
Prosecutors may want to step back and look to other ways apart
from testimony where they can use plea agreements, such as in gaining
assistance in an investigation. 135 If an accomplice aids in an investigation, it may lead to the discovery of a witness who would not need a
plea-bargain in order to take the stand. 36 A plea agreement, however,
provides the witness with some protection. 3 7 Just as one can see perjury
as a form of acting an in uncooperative manner, so can the accomplice
see a prosecutor going back on a plea agreement by rescinding his
plea.i 38 These situations cannot be frequent, for to allow either the
prosecutor or the witness to back in and out or plea agreements sets a
dangerous precedent which threatens the very value of plea
agreements. 139 This kind of system would not decrease the number of
court cases, as plea bargains have done in the past, but would rather increase the number of hearings and motions of those witnesses trying to
back-pedal on plea agreements.14°
V. CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that the plea-bargaining process is volatile and not always desirable. 4 ' It is not the longstanding acceptance of
the practice that lends it credibility. It is hard to imagine a judicial system in which prosecutors have no device other than an appeal to ethics
with which to encourage an accomplice to testify. Without a bargaining
'34See

United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1531 (8th Cir. 1984) (describing

certain plea agreements as "invitation to perjury").
""See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1355 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining "myriad" of ways witnesses can aid prosecution without taking witness stand).
' See id. (explaining that when an accomplice cooperates he/she often leads
prosecutors to other witnesses).
7
"S See United States v. Santobello, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971)
(stating that unkept
plea agreements are grounds for relief).
See id. (explaining importance of keeping plea agreements).
See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (suggesting that unkept plea
agreement could cause accomplice's testimony to be involuntary).
" See id. (stating that plea agreements must have some measure of finality).
See id. at 1627 (admitting that plea bargains may not be ideal system, but are
beneficial).
'4
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device, however, the number of convictions would drop significantly.
Plea-bargains serve a purpose and like most useful methods they can be
refined over time. As is their duty to their clients, defense attorneys will
continue to look for ways in which they can invalidate plea agreements.
At the same time, prosecutors will continue, often with the help of plea
agreements, to attain the highest number of convictions possible. This is
the government's duty to its client: the citizen.
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